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This paper discusses the technology-neutral statutes that enable electronic signatures and 
records to be accepted in lieu of manually signed paper records.  In part II, the paper 
focuses on the language provided by the federal Electronic Signatures in National and 
Global E-Commerce Act (“E-Sign Act”) and the model Uniform Electronic Transactions 
Act (“UETA”), which states may adopt.  The various electronic and digital technologies 
and how they work are discussed in parts III and IV.  Part V describes the various 
positive and negative security considerations.  Recommendations as to the appropriate 
level of security necessary for electronic transactions are offered in part VI. 
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I. Introduction 
 Traditional business transactions were conducted in person.  Contracts and other 
documents were signed by hand, and these signatures indicated proof of identity and 
intent to be bound by the contract.  The signing of a contract often was witnessed, 
acknowledged, or notarized to further assure the identities and intent of the parties.  
However, computer-generated documents with a name typed as the signature do not 
provide any assurances.  In e-mail, it is possible for a person to type someone else’s name 
as the “signature” and also mask the sender’s identity and address or send it 
anonymously.  The recipient might think the message came legitimately from the person 
indicated and act on the message.  For important, private, or sensitive information, an 
unsecured transaction that can be observed or altered by others is not desirable. 
Electronic commerce (e-commerce) has become big business.  With the 
proliferation of business transacted on the Internet, the need for security has also 
increased.1  People and companies want assurances that their electronic transactions are 
secure.  The authentication provided by digital signatures is critical, since people often 
falsify their identities or personal information online.  In a study conducted by the 
Graphic, Visualization & Usability Center at the Georgia Institute of Technology, “48.6% 
of more than 10,000 respondents indicated that they never provide false information. This 
means that more than half of the respondents do actually report false information.”  
Therefore, based on estimates of the online consumer population, “more than 18 million 
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American consumers [falsified] their identities or personal information online by late 
1999.”2   
 First, this paper will discuss the requirements of the Electronic Signatures in 
National and Global E-Commerce Act3 (“E-Sign Act”) and Uniform Electronic 
Transactions Act4 (“UETA”) for electronic signatures, followed by a discussion of the 
current electronic signature technologies available.  After reviewing the electronic 
technologies available, an overview of the problem of identity theft will highlight the 
security concerns of e-commerce consumers and providers.  In the final section, this 
paper will recommend which electronic signature technologies are appropriate for use 
and the level of security they provide. 
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II. The E-Sign Act and UETA:  What Are These Laws? 
A. E-Sign Act 
 In essence, the E-Sign Act prevents states from denying legal effect to electronic 
documents solely due to their electronic form, thereby raising barriers to e-commerce.  It 
promotes electronic commerce by establishing that electronic technology satisfies the 
traditional writing requirements for paper documents, an intent expressed by legislators in 
their Congressional Record Statements.5  The statute is technology-neutral in that it does 
not give greater or lesser status or effect to specific technologies or specifications.  In 
relevant part, the E-Sign Act states: 
§ 101.—General Rule of Validity 
(a) In General.—Notwithstanding any statute, regulation, or other rule of law 
(other than this title and title II), with respect to any transaction in or affecting 
interstate or foreign commerce— 
(1) a signature, contract, or other record relating to such transaction may not 
be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because it is in 
electronic form; and 
(2) a contract relating to such transaction may not be denied legal effect, 
validity, or enforceability solely because an electronic signature or 
electronic record was used in its formation.6 
 
As used in this statute, “electronic” relates to “technology having electrical, digital, 
magnetic, wireless, optical, electromagnetic, or similar capabilities.”7  An “electronic 
signature” is defined broadly as “an electronic sound, symbol, or process, attached to or 
logically associated with a contract or other record and executed or adopted by a person 
with the intent to sign the record.”8 
Pursuant to the E-Sign Act, § 102(a), states may modify, limit, or supersede the 
provisions of § 101 with respect to state law only if such statute adopts the UETA as 
approved and recommended by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
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State Laws (NCCUSL) in 1999 or provides for alternative procedures or requirements for 
the use and/or access of electronic records or signatures for legal effect consistent with 
the E-Sign Act.  These alternative laws must be technology neutral in order to satisfy the 
E-Sign Act’s requirements.9 
B. UETA 
UETA supports use of electronic commerce by establishing legal recognition of 
electronic records, signatures, and contracts, and by providing procedural rules for 
conducting electronic transactions.  Like the E-Sign Act, it states that a record or 
signature cannot be denied legal effect or enforceability solely due to its electronic form 
and an electronic record satisfies the legal writing requirement for records and signatures.  
In relevant part, UETA states: 
 (a) A record or signature may not be denied legal effect or enforceability 
solely because it is in electronic form. 
(b) A contract may not be denied legal effect or enforceability solely because 
an electronic record was used in its formation. 
(c) If a law requires a record to be in writing, an electronic record satisfies the 
law. 
(d) If a law requires a signature, an electronic signature satisfies the law.10 
 
Like the E-Sign Act, UETA defines “electronic” as “relating to technology having 
electrical, digital, magnetic, wireless, optical, electromagnetic, or similar capabilities”11 
and "electronic signature" as “an electronic sound, symbol, or process attached to or 
logically associated with a record and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to 
sign the record.”12   
 While both the E-Sign Act and UETA contain similar language that electronic 
signatures shall not be denied legal effect or enforceability merely because of their form, 
they are not identical in coverage.  UETA is more comprehensive and addresses security 
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areas such as attribution, or “Whose signature is this?”  Under UETA § 9, a person 
cannot be bound to a record if that person’s name was not entered, ratified, or provided 
by someone acting on behalf of that person.  An electronic record or signature can be 
attributed to someone only if it was a act of that person, which can be established by 
relevant evidence, including technological or password information that can establish 
identity.13 
C. What Law Controls? 
  1. E-Sign Act’s Scope 
For states that do not enact UETA or other electronic records and signatures 
legislation, the E-Sign Act governs electronic transactions and records.  Where a state has 
enacted UETA or other technology-neutral legislation, those laws control intrastate 
transactions and the E-Sign Act governs interstate and foreign transactions.14   The E-
Sign Act also promotes use and acceptance of electronic signatures internationally.15  
Where a state has enacted a modified UETA or other electronic validation laws, those 
laws must be reviewed under E-Sign Act § 102(a)(2).  According to Nimmer, federal 
policy indicates “a narrow deference to state sovereignty on matters involving electronic 
records and signatures.”16   The E-Sign Act was not intended to preempt state law 
because 1) it does not expressly state that intent and 2) states are allowed to make choices 
without restricting the technology-neutral requirement.  Since the E-Sign Act does not 
occupy the whole field, state laws that do not conflict with it are permitted.17 
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  2. Technology-Specific Statutes 
 Several states have adopted UETA or other electronic records and signatures 
legislation.  There are three main groups of statutes, ranging from minor to major changes 
of the E-Sign Act and UETA language.18   
 Utah enacted the first digital signature legislation in 1995,19 based on the Digital 
Signature Guidelines promulgated by the American Bar Association Security 
Committee.20  This statute provides that records utilizing dual public key encryption with 
third-party certification will be attributed to, and be legally binding on, the person who 
has been issued that key.  While the Utah statute does not invalidate any other signature 
technologies that may be valid, it has accorded greater legal status or effect to records or 
signatures utilizing public key encryption.21 
 Illinois has enacted a statute containing general language approving electronic 
signatures, but provides that “secure” signatures and records will receive heightened legal 
effect.22  A “secure” electronic signature or record is created by agreement of the parties 
or upon certification by the Illinois Secretary of State.23 
 California provides that an electronic signature has the same force as a manual 
signature if: 1) it is unique to the person using it; 2) it can be verified; 3) the person using 
it maintains sole control over it; and 4) it conforms to regulations adopted by the 
Secretary of State. 24  The Secretary of State has promulgated regulations that are 
technology-neutral and that do not regulate the licensing or approval of Certification 
Authorities.  Digital signature technology and signature dynamics are both acceptable if 
they provide signatures in conformity with the statute.25   
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3. Does the E-Sign Act Preempt Nonconforming State Laws? 
 State law that does not conform to the requirements of E-Sign Act § 101 will be 
evaluated under § 102(a)(2).  Since the legislative history comments state that laws with 
any variation from the exact UETA document may or may not be eligible under § 
102(a)(2), Nimmer interprets it as placing the entire statute at issue under § 102(a)(2) and 
not just the nonconforming provisions because it is not an adoption of the UETA exactly 
as approved by NCCUSL.26  However, others argue that only nonconforming provisions 
of an enactment should be evaluated under § 102(a)(2), thus rendering only the 
inconsistent provisions ineffective while saving the remainder of the statute.27  Fry 
considers two other possible readings of the preemption language but finds both to be less 
persuasive: 
Under one, if the State statute has any non-uniform provision, the entire 
enactment is ineffective and federal law governs.  Such as reading would be 
consistent with the literal language of subsection (a)(1) and would force the entire 
packet of State legislation to be evaluated for consistency and in terms of medium 
neutrality under subsection (a)(2).  Under the second, but least persuasive 
alternative reading, non-uniform provisions do not survive, whether or not they 
would be acceptable under subsection (a)(2).28 
 
Whether preemption requires an entire nonconforming statute or just the nonconforming 
portions of a statute to be reviewed and possibly preempted has not been decided through 
case law.  As the law develops in this area, court decisions or legislation will clarify the 
issue. 
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III. Electronic Signatures 
 A. Signatures 
What is a signature? It is any mark made with the intention of authenticating the 
marked document.29  The law defines a signature as a symbol, even an X, a thumbprint, 
or sometimes a corporate letterhead, adopted with the intent to comply.30  Marks 
fulfilling this definition have been used throughout history.  To make a contract under 
Roman law, a citizen pressed his signet ring into a wax tablet. During the Middle Ages, 
Europeans affixed a clay seal to a document to authenticate the marked contract.  Later, 
parties to a contract hand-scripted their signatures.31  Webster’s Dictionary defines a 
signature as “the name of a person written with his or her own hand.”32  
What is an “electronic signature”?  Under the Webster’s Dictionary definition, an 
electronic signature is not a signature at all.  An electronic signature is “any symbol, 
mark or method, accomplished by electronic means, executed by a party with the present 
intent to be bound by a record or to authenticate a record.”33  An electronic signature can 
be any electronic mark signifying agreement. This definition covers a wide range of 
signature types—from digitized images of a handwritten signature to a retinal scan. Some 
electronic signatures are very secure. A retinal scan, for example, is almost impossible to 
duplicate. Other electronic signatures are less secure, such as a handwritten signature that 
can be scanned, saved as a computerized image, and used to “sign” documents.34 
A signature implies uniqueness and is associated with a person’s identity. The 
tiny differences that are “a reflection of physical and psychological identity” mean that 
no two signatures are identical, but they also dictate that two signatures by the same 
person will be much more alike than the same signature produced by two different 
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people.35  Thus, “geometric uniqueness” establishes authenticity for handwritten 
signatures.36  However, in the digital world, the computer can copy or alter geometric 
representations, so another method is needed to establish signature uniqueness or 
signature authenticity.37   
B. Biometrics  
Biometric methods offer another form of secure electronic signatures that promise 
a high level of security.  Unlike digital signatures, which rely on authentication, biometric 
security relies on proof of identification.  It involves measuring and recognizing some 
unique biological aspect of, or physical act performed by, a particular human being.  
Examples of biometric technologies include fingerprint imaging, voice recognition, retina 
scanning, and facial recognition.38   
These biometric techniques can be practical and reasonably priced.  Biometrics 
also offers the advantage of quick and secure verification of a person’s identity in routine 
transactions. Finger imaging, voice recognition, and the stylus and digitizer technologies 
can be installed on a personal computer.   Retina scanning or finger imaging could 
replace the use of personal identification numbers (PINs) at ATM machines, while smart 
cards containing biometric information could be used in place of credit cards, debit cards 
or driver’s licenses.39  
 In addition, other forms of biometric authentication may be incorporated into 
digital authentication protocols. For example, a biometric fingerprint or eye scan 
authentication system might be used in a hybrid system instead of a passphrase to protect 
the private key in a cryptographic system.  Many of these methods have different levels 
of reliability and utility for digital authentication.  Companies involved in biometric 
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identification admit that while units are sophisticated in detecting fraudulent identifiers, 
such as recordings of voices or copies of fingerprints, the output data of the biometric 
reader is susceptible to interception as it is transmitted for verification.  These security 
technologies serve as a warning that states should expect the development of other secure 
technologies and not that other technologies are ready for “prime time” at present.40    
C. Signature Representations 
Other technologies may be able to create electronic signatures of approximately 
equal security to cryptographic signatures, such as signature dynamics technology.  
Signature dynamics systems digitally record a manual signature with a special stylus and 
digitizer pad.41   The digitizer pad analyzes many biometric measures of signature 
behavior such as the time taken to complete a signature, including pauses between 
strokes, points, curves, the pressure applied on the pen pad at various points in the 
signing process; the overall size of the signature; the form and shape of the signature; the 
length and angle of lines, arcs, and curves; the number of loops, slopes, velocity, and 
acceleration; and other features of a handwritten signature, creating a “biometric 
token.”42   This biometric token can be transmitted to authenticate a digital document43 
and provide evidentiary information for comparison against future signatures.  This 
method provides security against fraud and forgery while “retaining the ceremonial 
aspects of a traditional signing.”44   
Electronic signatures are different from digital signatures, which are discussed in 
part IV.  An electronic signature refers to the string of bits that digitally represents a 
handwritten signature captured by a computer system when a human applies it on an 
electronic pen pad connected to the system.45  Signature dynamics is a biometric input 
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capturing method because it measures human-dependent characteristics.  Human 
signatures are reflexive actions not subject to deliberate muscular control, so imitation of 
a signature is difficult.  Since a person cannot manually produce two identical 
handwritten signatures, computerized comparisons cannot be based on a bit-to-bit 
comparison, but through statistical and probability tests.  Most dynamic electronic 
signature verification systems today are approximately 96 percent accurate when the 
signer is relatively consistent.  Accuracy decreases with inconsistent signers or when 
wear and tear affects the equipment.46   
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IV. Digital Signatures 
 A. What Are They? 
Although the terms “electronic signature” and “digital signature” are often used 
interchangeably, “digital signature” is a special type of electronic signature.47   
“Electronic signatures” is a broader term that applies to any signature in electronic form, 
including a name typed at the end of an e-mail message.48  “Digital signature” is a term of 
art for computer encryption technology that provides secure signatures on electronic 
documents, such as public key infrastructure.49  Digital signatures authenticate electronic 
documents in much the same way that handwritten signatures authenticate printed 
documents.50   
A digital signature is not the same as an electronically stored handwritten 
signature.  The phrase “digital signature” has been called “the most unfortunate 
nomenclature mistake in the history of cryptography”51 because it is not like a traditional 
manual signature.  A digital signature is a computer-entrusted code that protects the 
authenticity of electronically filed documents, guarding against tampering and assuring 
both parties that the transmitted information is complete and accurate.52  It is a string of 
bits that uniquely represents a second string of bits, the digital document.  It is formed 
using a combination of software techniques and cryptography, based on a secret value 
known only to the signer.  Unlike a human signature, a digital signature is unique to each 
document signed digitally, although the secret value remains the same.  To verify that a 
digital signature is valid in public key encryption infrastructure (“PKI”), there is a 
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corresponding verification function and a public key that uniquely identifies or represents 
the signer.53   
 B.  How Does It Work? 
  1. In General 
 There are two kinds of digital signatures: “signatures good enough for a six dollar 
trade among friends, and signatures good enough for a six figure trade between 
strangers.”54   The first type is called symmetric, or single key, encryption.   The same 
key is used to encrypt and decrypt the document.  For example, Alice and Bob agree on 
an algorithm and a key.  Alice encrypts a message with the key and sends the ciphertext 
to Bob, who then decrypts it with the same key.55   The message is secure only if third 
parties do not know the key.56  Single key encryption is analogous to a combination safe, 
where people placing items into and taking them out of the safe must be able to open the 
combination lock.57   
 The second type of digital signature is public key, or asymmetric, encryption,58 
often referred to as public key infrastructure (“PKI”).59  In a public key system, Bob 
generates two different but corresponding keys.  The public key can encrypt messages 
and the private key can decrypt the first key’s resulting ciphertext.  Bob can now publish 
the public key for Alice to encrypt her message to him, secure in the knowledge that Eve 
(who lacks the private key) cannot decrypt the message.   “Public key encryption is 
analogous to a post office box, where anyone can deposit mail once the recipient’s 
specific box number (the public key) is known, although only the box holder with the 
(private) key can open the box.”60  This system is better suited for communication over 
open networks such as the Internet, because there is no secret key that must be 
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protected.61  Under this system, communications to groups require more steps.  The 
message must be encrypted for each recipient’s private key, like placing a separate copy 
of the message, uniquely coded, in Bob’s, Carol’s, and Dave’s post office boxes.  Also, 
using a public key algorithm is “roughly a thousand times [slower than using] a 
symmetric algorithm.”62     
 In practice, PKI programs are actually hybrid systems.  In these systems, the 
public keys are used only to encrypt and securely transmit a symmetric encryption key 
called a session key. The session key is used to encrypt and decrypt the content of a 
specific communication, and is not reused after that communication is completed.  This 
system avoids the problem of needing a secure channel to communicate keys in a 
symmetric system, and the slowness of using public key cryptography alone.63     
There are two public key infrastructure (“PKI”) models, the “open” and “closed” 
models. The term PKI usually refers to the services and protocols that support the 
application of public key cryptography, including: obtaining or generating a party’s 
public key; the issuance of a digital certificate for a public key by a Certification 
Authority (CA); cancellation of a public key if the private key is lost or compromised; 
and a methodology for evaluating whether a certificate is valid and its authorized 
operations.  An open model assumes that a subscriber obtains a digital certificate from a 
CA that will securely link her identity to her public key for all, or at least many, purposes. 
Thus, in an open PKI environment, a person could obtain a digital certificate and then use 
it for a transaction requiring a digital signature such as ordering goods online, signing 
legally binding agreements, and filing documents with a government entity.  In the closed 
PKI model, users obtain a different digital certificate for each online use. The difference 
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is significant. In an open PKI model, a person’s certificate could potentially sign any 
document, resulting in severe consequences if the private key is compromised. In a 
closed PKI, the risks of a fraudulently signed document are more limited because of the 
system’s more narrowly defined scope.64   
  2. The Technical Procedure 
The phrase “digital signature” is a term of art for a process whereby a 
mathematical formula secures and authenticates a message.  A digital signature requires 
two processes:  1) PKI, a particular method of using mathematical algorithms to scramble 
a communication, and 2) a hash function to verify the integrity of a message.  With a 
public key system, the software generates two related keys—a public key and a private 
key.  The public key is available for anyone to know, while the only the owner knows the 
private key.  Only the public key can decrypt a message encoded with the private key, 
and only the private key can decode a message encoded with the public key.65  A hash 
function is a process used to verify the integrity of a message. This procedure creates a 
number, the message digest, which represents the message.  The algorithm produces a 
message digest uniquely based on the data in the message that cannot be reproduced if 
the message has been altered.  Any change to the message produces a different message 
digest.   
The technology works as follows. After writing his message, the sender performs 
the “hash function” to generate the message digest, a string of code.  The sender then 
encrypts this message digest with his private key, attaches this “signature” to the end of 
the document, and sends the “signed” document to the recipient.  The recipient, using the 
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same software, can perform a hash function on the message. If the message digests are 
identical, the recipient knows that the message was not altered during transmission.66 
 
  3. Certificates of Ownership 
   a. Additional Assurance 
Another important element in the chain of document security is the certificate, a 
digital document attesting that a particular public key has been given to an individual or 
entity.  It verifies that a given public key does in fact belong to a given individual, much 
like presenting photographic identification at the bank.67 
 This association of a digital signature with an individual’s identity must also be 
verified. Currently, anyone can create a public key-private key pair in the name of any 
particular person and upload it to databases of public keys.68  How does one confirm that 
the individual who created the key for “Elmer Fudd” is Elmer Fudd? Without 
independent verification, the public key of Elmer Fudd may be a fraud perpetrated by an 
imposter purporting to be the true Elmer Fudd.  People may unwittingly rely on a 
fraudulent digital signature. Therefore, digitally signed messages purporting to be 
associated with an individual identity should be attested to by a trusted third party, a 
certification authority, to minimize the occurrences of fraudulent representations.69   
 Certification authorities (“CAs”) maintain repositories of public keys and 
authenticate and legitimize the relationship between a person and a particular public 
key.70  A repository is “an electronic database of certificates—the equivalent of [an 
online] digital Yellow Pages” accessible to the general public.  Unlike the Yellow Pages, 
however, a user may be charged for access to the information.71    
  17  
 
  
 
  
    i. Obtaining a Certificate 
First, the subscriber generates a public key-private key pair. He then visits the CA 
in person with proof of his identity.  A driver’s license and/or passport is acceptable, 
since either is an official document with a photograph.  The subscriber then demonstrates 
that he has the corresponding private key to a public key-private key pair without 
disclosing it, usually by sending a digitally signed electronic message in the presence of 
the CA.72   
Once the CA verifies the association between an identified person and public key, 
it issues a certificate, an electronically stored record attesting to the connection between 
the public key and the subscriber.  The certificate identifies the issuing CA, the 
subscriber, and the subscriber’s public key.  It may also contain other relevant 
information, such as the key expiration date, size, and a signature generation software 
identifier.73  A CA may give notice of the creation and contents of a certificate by 
providing the subscriber with a printed representation of the certificate; by allowing the 
subscriber to view the contents of the certificate online; or by communicating the content 
of the certificate to the subscriber in any other reasonable way, such as by first-class mail.  
The CA attaches its own digital signature to the certificate if it is sent electronically.   
Once the CA issues a certificate, the subscriber must review its contents to ensure 
accuracy before the certificate is made publicly available.  The subscriber must accept the 
certificate for both verification and validation.  After the subscriber has reviewed the 
contents of the certificate and is satisfied with the certificate’s accuracy, he or she may 
publish the certificate or direct the CA to do so.  Once the CA publishes the certificate, it 
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represents that the subscriber has accepted the certificate, and the certificate is given a 
presumption of validity.74    
 
 
   ii. Using the Certificate 
When a certificate is published, it is made available to third parties. A certificate 
is published when it is recorded in a repository, or otherwise circulated, and made 
accessible to all parties desiring to correspond with the subscriber.  When the subscriber 
wishes to send a message, he or she would send the message along with a message digest 
and a certificate that links him to the public key. The recipient can then go to an online 
database to check the validity of the certificate.75 
The most secure use of authentication involves enclosing one or more certificates 
with every signed message. The recipient verifies the certificate using the certifying 
authority’s public key. He or she then verifies the message’s signature. Two or more 
certificates could be enclosed with the message, forming a hierarchical chain wherein one 
certificate testifies to the authenticity of the previous certificate,  similar to current 
methods of establishing personal identity with multiple official identification 
documents.76  The CA’s digital signature can be verified by using the public key of that 
CA listed in another certificate issued by another CA, and that certificate can then be 
authenticated by the public key listed in yet another certificate, and so on until a 
satisfactory level of trust regarding the original certificate is achieved. The digital 
certificate can also contain additional information, including a reliance limit or a 
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reference to the CA’s “certification practice statement” that gives relying parties notice of 
the level of inquiry conducted by the CA before issuing the certificate.77 
   b. Compromised Certificates 
 A private key, like a physical key, must be physically safeguarded. If a third party 
discovers the private key, the security of all communications using that private key is 
compromised. When the private key is either lost or compromised, the individual should 
immediately suspend or revoke the corresponding certificate. The certificates stored at a 
repository usually contain the status of the certificate, such as whether the certificate is 
“valid,” “suspended,” or “revoked.”  Revoked certificates are also stored on a Certificate 
Revocation List (“CRL”), which is a separate database of certificates and their 
corresponding public keys that have been revoked before their expiration date.78 
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V. Security Issues 
 A. The Threat of Identity Theft 
 Identity theft is the illicit use of a person’s personal information or identifying 
facts, such as name, date of birth, Social Security Number, address, or other information, 
to perpetrate fraud.  In the past, identity information was commonly stolen through 
pickpocketing, taking pre-approved credit applications from mailboxes, or finding 
receipts in the trash.  Today, thieves can use credit reports to acquire false identity cards, 
open credit accounts, and run up large debts against innocent victims.79   In extreme 
cases of identity theft,  
a perpetrator may wholly co-opt another person’s identity—obtaining driver’s and 
professional licenses, obtaining employment, applying for apartments, taking out 
home and automobile loans, applying for credit cards, and even receiving traffic 
tickets and warrants under the false identity.80  
 
Eventually the imposter may file bankruptcy proceedings to discharge the debt, which is 
when some victims first learn of the crime.81  Identity theft is now a federal offense.82 
Businesses want “the ability to predict, with a fair degree of certainty, what lies 
ahead in our daily lives, the ability to control it, and the ability to identify, again with a 
fair degree of certainty, the risks that we may face so that we can take protective 
measures.”83   Businesses involved in e-commerce want to secure online transactions, 
which require entering into agreements that both parties believe will be performed.   On 
the Internet, the person with whom you are dealing may not be who he or she claims to 
be, as is demonstrated by the proverbial cartoon:  “On the Internet, nobody knows you’re 
a dog.”84  Electronic transactions must be secure so that parties have reasonable assurance 
that they are dealing with people who actually are who they say they are.  Both 
businesses and individuals are investing in encryption technologies to protect their 
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proprietary information and communications, protect their privacy, and prevent theft, 
industrial espionage, and identity theft.85   
How can someone ascertain that a person is who he claims to be, especially at the 
initial Internet contact?  A first-time contract should be protected by strong security 
measures.  One relatively secure method is  
by sending paper copies through the postal service to a bricks-and-mortar address 
supplied by the customer, which copies are hand signed and returned by the 
customer as proof of attribution.  In this case, identity may be inferred from a 
number of indicia, including the presence of a person at a physical address to 
receive a postal letter, and calligraphic signature evidence.  In the online analog, 
the identities associated with electronic signatures on first-time contracts must 
also be inferred by indicia that are at least as reliable as those for paper contracts.  
One technology with promise for bridging the gap at time of enrollment involves 
the use of “digital signatures” as an electronic means to associate a real identity 
with an electronic signature.86 
 
B. What Is Needed? 
With the pervasive use of computers today, many organizations and institutions 
would like to conduct more of their activities through electronic means. However, the 
increased use of computer technology has not eliminated the need to ensure the 
completeness, accuracy and authenticity of legally signed electronic documents. It is now 
necessary to find digital equivalents that ensure authenticity, integrity, and non-
repudiation.  Authentication ascertains the originator of a digital document, to protect 
against imposters.  Integrity is necessary to verify that a digital document has not been 
altered in transit or replaced by a false document.  Finally, non-repudiation ensures that 
the sender cannot later deny that he sent the document.87  Laws that validate e-commerce 
provide legal security for enforcing electronic transactions and setting forth the rules for 
such transactions.  Without a clear legal framework, encryption or authentication 
technology will not provide adequate security for electronic business transactions.88 
  22  
 
  
 
  
 C. Advantages of Using Digital Signatures 
Traditional handwritten signatures are vulnerable for several reasons.  First, there 
is no standard for a handwritten signature, so they can vary, making signature verification 
difficult. Second, handwritten signatures can be easily forged or copied.  Finally, on 
multiple page documents, it may be unclear whether the signature applies to all pages or 
whether pages have been added or deleted since the signing.  By comparison, digital 
signatures have features that provide a higher level of security over handwritten 
signatures.89 
First, a key feature of digital signatures is proof of data integrity, or the assurance 
that the data has not been accidentally or intentionally altered.  The message digest or 
hash algorithm fulfills this function since it is unique to the document.  It indicates if any 
unauthorized or accidental changes have occurred.90   
Second, authentication answers the question, “Who sent this message?”  The 
answer to this question has been important even for handwritten signatures, which are not 
considered legally binding in and of themselves.  Any signature, handwritten or 
electronic, must be authenticated.  This was traditionally done through a notary public.  
In the digital world, CAs provide the necessary authentication, and the certification 
becomes inextricably part of the document.91  
Third, non-repudiation is particularly important in electronic commerce.  The 
signer and recipient of a document cannot deny the existence or integrity of the 
transaction secured by digital signature technology.  Three things provide proof of the 
transaction and ensure its integrity: 1) the existence of the original message; 2) the 
associated encrypted message digest; and 3) the attached digital certificate.  If the 
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transaction was questioned, it could be proven that “the sender’s public key decrypts a 
given message digest; the message digest corresponds to the message in question; and the 
relevant certification authority listed the sender’s certificate as valid at the time of the 
transaction.”92      
Fourth, most digital signature technologies include a date and time stamp function 
that can be critical for use in electronic commerce and legal actions.  This is critical to the 
implementation of digital certificates because the date and time will be used to verify 
whether the digital signature was created during the operational period stated in the 
certificate.93 
Fifth, according to IBM, digital signatures can increase the speed and accuracy of 
transactions.  Documents can be signed and transmitted around the world in just a few 
seconds.  Digital documents and signatures can be processed faster and more accurately 
by automated systems than a human being can evaluate a handwritten signature.  Thus, 
the speed and security of digital transactions is enhanced through the use of digital 
signatures.94   
Finally, digital signature technology can increase confidentiality, ensuring that 
only the appropriate recipients can decrypt the message because only they have access to 
the appropriate key.  Although there is no control over what happens to the message after 
it has been decrypted, unauthorized access is protected during transmission, which is the 
most critical and vulnerable period.95 
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 D. Concerns About Digital Signatures 
1. What Do Digital Signatures Secure? 
Digital signatures prove, mathematically, that a secret value known as the private 
key was present in a computer at the time the subscriber’s or sender’s signature was 
calculated. It is a small step from that to assume that the sender associated with the 
private key entered that key into the computer at the time of signing. But it is a much 
larger step to assume that the sender intended a particular document to be signed. And 
without a tamperproof computer trusted by the sender, digital signatures can be 
contested.96 
While a digital signature authenticates the document up to the point of the signing 
computer, it does not authenticate the link between that computer and the person 
composing the document.  The computer signs the document, not the person.97  In some 
instances, authenticating to the signing computer is good enough, and no further 
authentication is required. However, for sensitive materials, this complaint should be 
considered: 
[C]ryptography, no matter how strong, cannot bridge the gap between me and my 
computer. Because the computer is not trusted, I cannot rely on it to show me 
what it is doing or do what I tell it to. Checking the calculation afterwards does 
not help; the untrusted computer can’t be relied upon to check the calculations 
properly. It wouldn’t help to verify the code, because the untrusted computer is 
running the code (and probably doing the verification). It wouldn’t even help to 
store the digital signature key in a secure module: the module still has to rely on 
the untrusted computer for input and output.98  
 
 2. Security Loopholes 
One of the most obvious and most common security problems with digital 
signatures is the human error factor.  There are several points at which human error can 
create problems.  If a private key is lost, stolen, or shared with someone other than its 
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owner, then that private key is no longer a reliable factor in the creation of digital 
signatures.99  Human error can also be a problem for digital certificates.  Inevitably, 
someone will type in a name or word incorrectly, resulting in an inaccurate certificate.100  
Unintentional errors by owners of private keys include lost or publicly displayed 
passwords, password sharing, and terminals left unattended after logging on.  Intentional 
human breaches of security include theft of passwords or private keys, tampering with the 
technological systems, or altering or forging the text of digital documents.101 
Many users are also concerned about the extreme sensitivity of private keys. Lost 
keys are impossible to regain, and a user who loses a key and is assigned a new one will 
have difficulty reestablishing his or her identity. This issue, which has no widely 
accepted solution, must be addressed by any organization using a digital signature 
system.102  
Additionally, digital signature passwords, private keys, and certificates must 
necessarily be stored somewhere, whether on paper or in electronic form.  There is the 
potential of losing electronic data.  The CA’s repository may be lost and unrecoverable 
due to technical failures.  Another access issue is whether unauthorized or illegal access 
to key and password data is possible.  In some situations, anyone with access to the 
software program can compromise others’ private keys.  Criminals in possession of the 
appropriate data could masquerade as someone else and perform electronic transactions 
using that person’s authorized key.103  It may be possible to store and backup a private 
key with multiple individuals or organizations so that cooperation between many people 
is necessary to access the key.  This may provide sufficient security for secondary 
backup.104 
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Reliance on CAs can also create security issues.  The digital certificate provided 
by a CA is a digital signature message from the issuer (signer or CA) to the verifier (user) 
that associates a name with a public key.  There are five issues to consider:  1) The signer 
may be compromised through theft.  CA’s protect against this possibility with either 
strong network, physical, and personnel security or independent signatures on the same 
certificate.  2) How did the signer know the information being certified?  A good signer 
should personally know the person and have proof of identity before certifying 
someone’s identity.  Some CAs, however, rely on public database information that is for 
sale, such as credit bureau information.  3) Did the issuer verify that the keyholder 
controlled the associated private key?  This proof would strengthen the presumption that 
the person’s identity was correct.  4) Did the user or receiver check to see if the key or 
certificate was revoked or suspended?  5) How are the computers of the sender and 
receiver protected?  Are terminals accessible to others?  Can the codes be tampered with 
or accessed easily?  Can someone send a message from one terminal with that person’s 
electronic identity attached to the message?105 
 PKI and digital signature technologies are almost completely secure against 
hacking and cracking.  While it is mathematically possible to break the algorithmic code, 
the time and resources needed to do so make it unlikely.  However, someone will 
eventually develop a new technology that will make it feasible.   The likelihood of this 
occurrence may depend on the strength of the algorithm used. 106 
 3. Costs 
As with almost all forms of technology, digital signature capabilities are not free. 
The institutional cost to the public may be significant, depending on the ability of 
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decision-makers to plan effectively. Creating or designating CAs or trusted third parties 
may be costly. At a minimum, existing institutions will need to spend money training 
their representatives to explain and sell the keys and software. At the opposite extreme, it 
will be expensive to create new institutions, establish accreditation procedures, and 
determine how to license and audit CAs.  There are also individual costs that a single user 
or a corporation must incur to purchase the actual software and keys from a CA.  The 
calculation of whether these costs exceed the benefits of creating a more predictable 
commercial and legal environment depends on whether policymakers can appropriately 
design and enact legislation that addresses the benefits and costs of digital signatures.107 
 E. Enhancing Security 
  1. Total Document Encryption 
 Instead of encrypting just the message digest, or digital signature, encryption 
systems based on the federal Digital Encryption Standard (DES), or alternatives such as 
the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) algorithm108 can be used to encrypt entire 
documents.109  Although encrypted digital signatures are more efficient than encrypted 
documents, sensitive materials may warrant encryption of the entire document.  
  2. Digital Notarization 
Digital notarization, a digital time stamp that indicates when a document was 
created, transmitted, received or processed, can provide protection for the integrity of a 
digital document’s contents as well.  A Digital Notary System based on patented time-
stamping protocols is commercially available today.110  
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  3. A Combined Electronic and Digital Signature Technology 
“The tendency of using a hammer to solve all our knocking problems is always 
there.”111    Some biometrics product vendors claim that dynamic electronic signatures 
are more secure than the digital signature technologies discussed above.   
In the dynamic electronic signature method, the digital document signature also is 
hashed into a message digest.  However, the dynamically captured electronic signature is 
appended to the document.  The message digest and the electronic signature are then 
bound together by applying encryption of the concatenation with a secret key.  To 
implement this method, there must be a process to capture a valid version of the person’s 
biometric characteristics in the system.  The registration process is necessary to ensure 
that the digital certificate required for verification purposes is issued to the correct person 
requesting it.  By combining an electronic signature and digital signature scheme, the 
registration process can be combined to “deter any would-be perpetrator from 
impersonating another person since such biometrics data provide [sic] an audit trail for 
the impersonator to be identified positively in the near future.”112  “There always needs to 
be an auditable event, something that lets people know why this person is signing.”113  If 
this combined technology results in greater certainty for people’s identities, and it is not 
cumbersome or costly to implement, Kang’s suggestion may be the next level of secure 
digital signatures. 
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VI. Recommendations 
 For the cautious, a higher level of security is preferable if it is not prohibitively 
time-consuming or expensive.  While there are many electronic technologies that meet 
the technology-neutral language of the E-Sign Act and UETA, at least one author 
believes that digital signature encryption (PKI) will be the de facto standard of e-
commerce transactions: 
Although hindsight after actual experience will obviously be the best teacher, the 
authors believe that PKI digital signatures will ultimately be recognized as 
providing a robust factual inference of identity—perhaps to the point that 
technologic neutrality and pre-emption of any legal presumption or other 
favorable legal status for PKI digital signatures will essentially not make much 
difference.  This inference will at first need to be established in the early litigated 
cases by appropriate expert and factual testimony showing that the digital 
signature process produces an accurate result.  But over time it can be expected 
that the need for this foundation will ultimately diminish or wither away as courts 
become more familiar with PKI digital signatures.114 
  
 If PKI becomes the standard, businesses and individuals who require even more 
protection are likely to adopt total document encryption technologies, such as RSA or a 
combination of electronic and digital signature technology as suggested by Kang.  With 
all of the security issues that must be addressed, prudent businesses and individuals 
should balance their need for security against their need for efficiency or speed and 
utilize the technology or combination of technologies that provides them with the best 
protection without seriously affecting whatever other considerations are important to 
them. 
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VII. Conclusion 
 The mainstreaming of Internet transactions has increased the need for secure 
electronic documents.  Electronic technologies have been created to meet the needs for 
authenticity, confidentiality, and security.  While electronic signatures using biometrics 
methods or representations of handwritten signatures are available, digital signatures, an 
encryption technology, offers the most security.  Digital signatures encryption technology 
comes in many forms and can be implemented with varying levels of security.  This 
paper has provided an overview of the technologies available and considerations to take 
into account when choosing the level of assurance needed for a transaction. 
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